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The Formulation of  Epistemological
Disjunctivism
Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*
Craig French
University of  Cambridge
Abstract
I argue that we should question the orthodox way of  thinking about episte-
mological disjunctivism. I suggest that we can formulate epistemological
disjunctivism in terms of  states of  seeing things as opposed to states of
seeing that p. Not only does this alternative formulation capture the core
aspects of  epistemological disjunctivism as standardly formulated, it has
two salient advantages. First, it avoids a crucial problem that arises for a
standard formulation of  epistemological disjunctivism – the basis prob-
lem. And second, it is less committed than standard formulations are in
the metaphysics of  perception.
1 What is Epistemological Disjunctivism?
Epistemological disjunctivism concerns the nature of  the rational support we get
from certain cases of  perceptual experience. Like perceptual disjunctivism (see
Snowdon (2005), Martin (2006)), epistemological disjunctivism involves a neg-
ative claim underpinned by a positive claim. To see how this works, let’s first
consider a position which contrasts with epistemological disjunctivism. (Note
that as others do, I’ll here be understanding epistemological disjunctivism just
as a thesis about the rational support provided by visual perceptions.)
*For helpful comments on an earlier draft thanks to Tom Avery, Chris Jay, Mark Eli Kalderon,
Bence Nanay, Jens Van ’t Klooster and Lee Walters, and for helpful general discussion thanks to
Clayton Littlejohn and Aidan McGlynn. A version of  this paper was given at the Edinburgh Epis-
temology Research Seminar, thanks to the audience on that occasion for very helpful questions
and comments, especially Jie Gao, Jesper Kallestrup, Christopher Ranalli, and Duncan Pritchard.
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Take a fully veridical experience which is a genuine perception of  a lemon
before me. And let’s suppose that this experience provides me with rational
support for the belief  that there is a lemon before me. That is to say, it provides
me with epistemic justification or warrant of  some variety to believe that there
is a lemon before me. (Call this the “Good” Case, as it involves a fully veridical
experience with genuine perceptual contact with an object). But now take a
subjectively indistinguishable hallucinatory experience as of  a lemon before me,
where there is no such lemon there (and hence no perceptual contact with a
lemon). And let’s suppose that this experience also provides me with rational
support of  some kind for the belief  that there is a lemon before me. (Call this the
“Bad” Case, as it involves a defective exercise of  the general capacity I have for
sensory experience – I have an experience but I don’t make perceptual contact
with my environment).
Now in one sense the rational standings I have in these different cases of  ex-
perience are the same. They are both rational standings, and moreover rational
standings with the same target belief  (content). That is, they are both rational
standings which epistemically justify or warrant the belief  that there is a lemon
there. So, at this generic level at least, the rational standings are alike, similarly to
how at the generic level the experiences I have are alike (they are both sensory
experiences, and moreover, both sensory experiences as of  a lemon).
A further thing we might hold about the rational standings involved in these
different cases is that they are the same in some more specific or fundamental
way. That is, we might think that the rational support that I have in the Good
Case is of  the same fundamental sort as the rational support I have in the Bad
Case, we might think, that is, that the rational standings have the same nature.
This is to endorse a sort of  common kind thesis regarding Bad Case and Good
Case rational support (on common kinds, see Martin (2006)). What more specif-
ically might one say about this alleged common kind?
In the Bad Case I have rational support to believe that there is a lemon
before me, even when that is not the case. Thus, whatever else we might say
about the nature of  the rational standing in the Bad Case, we have to say at least
this: the specific kind of  rational support present in the Bad Case is such that it
can obtain even when the supported belief  is false. It is then not essential to the
rational support in the Bad Case that it is factive, that it requires the truth of  what
it supports. So if  the rational support had in the Good Case is fundamentally
like the rational support had in the Bad Case then even in such a case it won’t be
of  the nature of  such rational support that it is factive. The negative condition
has to apply even to the rational support present in the Good Case. Thus the
specific kind of  rational support one has even in the Good Case – where one’s
belief  is in fact true – is such that its obtaining doesn’t require the truth of  the
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belief  it rationally supports.
According to the common kind claim it is held that Bad Case and Good
Case rational support are fundamentally the same, and thus not in their nature
factive.
Epistemological disjunctivism involves a negative claim – the denial of  the
common kind thesis – underpinned by a positive claim. Thus, Duncan Pritchard,
who has in recent work done a lot to clarify and develop epistemological dis-
junctivism, states that epistemological disjunctivism is
the rejection of  idea that the… rational support one possesses in
favour of  one’s perceptual belief  is the same regardless of  whether
one is having a normal veridical perceptual experience as opposed
to being the victim of  an introspectively indistinguishable experi-
ence which is in fact deceptive or untrustworthy in some way (e.g.,
a hallucination) (2011, p. 434).
[The] two rational standings are radically different in kind (this is
what makes this epistemological proposal disjunctivist) (2012, p.
16).
We can thus put the negative strand of  epistemological disjunctivism in this way:
The Negative Claim
The rational support in the Good and Bad Cases are not of  the same
nature or fundamental kind.
Epistemological disjunctivism also involves a positive thesis which underlies the
negative claim. Pritchard puts the positive thesis like this:
The Core Thesis
In paradigmatic cases of  perceptual knowledge an agent, S , has per-
ceptual knowledge that  in virtue of  being in possession of  rational
support, R, for her belief  that  which is both factive (i.e. R’s obtain-
ing entails ), and reflectively accessible to S (2012, p. 13).
A paradigmatic case of  perceptual knowledge is one where that knowledge
is grounded in a perfectly veridical case of  perception. The nature of  the rational
support provided by these cases of  perception, the Core Thesis tells us, is such
that it is reflectively accessible, and factive.
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How does this positive claim underpin the Negative Claim mentioned above?
Here, factivity is doing the work (I’ll return to the reflective accessibility aspect
shortly). To say that a kind of  rational support is factive is to say that if  rational
support of  that specific kind obtains then it must be that the supported belief
is true. So the Core Thesis tells us that in a perfectly veridical experience as of
a lemon before me, say, the rational support to believe that there is a lemon
before me I have is, of  its nature, factive. Rational support of  that specific kind
just can’t obtain unless there is a lemon there before me. But now consider
the rational support I have in a subjectively indistinguishable but non-veridical
hallucinatory experience. As noted above, such rational support is not, in its
nature, factive. Thus, given the Core Thesis, Bad Case rational support thus
differs in fundamental kind to Good Case rational support. To simplify: if  the
Core Thesis is true, then given the facts about Bad Cases, the Negative Claim
follows.
The view we have outlined so far is quite generic. But epistemological dis-
junctivism is standardly understood in a yet more specific way. Once again we
can draw on Pritchard’s helpful presentation, and we can put the further speci-
fication of  the Core Thesis, like this:
The Specification
The particular kind of  rational support that the epistemological dis-
junctivist claims that our beliefs enjoy in paradigm cases of  percep-
tual knowledge is that provided by seeing that the target proposition
obtains. So when one has paradigmatic perceptual knowledge of
a proposition, p, one’s reflectively accessible rational support for
believing that p is that one sees that p (p. 14).
What I want to highlight concerning this further specification is that the epis-
temological disjunctivist holds that the visual perceptual states which ground
perceptual knowledge, that is, the visual perceptual states which are at the heart
of  the epistemological disjunctivist’s epistemology of  perception, are states of
seeing that p. I take it the idea is that we are to view such states as constituting the
rational support for belief  had in paradigm cases of  perceptual knowledge. If  we
assume that such states are factive and reflectively accessible, then this works
just fine as a specification of  the Core Thesis, and gives us a more complete
version of  epistemological disjunctivism.
To summarize, epistemological disjunctivism involves a negative claim under-
written by a positive claim. In my presentation there are three elements that
make up the view: (1) The Negative Claim. This is the denial of  the common
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kind thesis: that is, it is the denial of  the claim that Good Case and Bad Case
rational support are of  the same non-factive nature. This is underwritten by
a positive claim. In its generic form, this is (2) the Core Thesis: rational sup-
port in paradigmatic cases of  perceptual knowledge is, in its nature, reflectively
accessible and factive. And in its specific form this is what I’ve called (3) The
Specification: reflectively accessible rational support in paradigmatic cases of  per-
ceptual knowledge is constituted by states of  seeing that p (a specific kind of
factive state).
There may be other ways of  developing epistemological disjunctivism, but
this, it seems to me, captures the core elements of  the standard version of  the
view. For instance, McDowell, the most prominent proponent of  epistemolog-
ical disjunctivism, can be read as committed to epistemological disjunctivism in
this sense (see e.g., McDowell (1982, 1995, 2008)).
McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism comes about in his rejection of  a
highest common factor conception of  perceptually grounded rational support,
based on a certain positive conception of  the rational support we have in Good
Cases. So take Good Case and Bad Case experiences respectively, McDowell
thinks that ‘[e]xperiences of  the first kind have an epistemic significance that
experiences of  the second kind do not have’ (2008, p. 381). And this is because
in the Good Case, McDowell thinks, one has rational support which is in its
nature factive. On McDowell’s view, in the Good Case, one has rational support
constituted by an experience which involves a fact, p, itself:
But we are not to accept that in non-deceptive cases [i.e., Good
Cases] too the object of  experience is a mere appearance, and hence
something that falls short of  the fact itself. On the contrary, the
appearance that is presented to one in those cases is a matter of  the
fact itself  being disclosed to the experiencer (1982, p. 387).
If  the kind of  rational support for p in the Good Case is constituted by an
experience in which the fact that p is itself  directly manifest to S , then rational
support of  that kind just could not obtain in a situation where it is not the case
that p. Such rational support is thus in its nature factive. This is a point that
McDowell puts in different ways. For instance, he sometimes puts it in terms
of  the indefeasibility:
When one’s perceptual faculties “engage the material world directly”,
as Wright puts it, the result—a case of  having an environmental
state of  affairs directly present to one in experience—constitutes
one’s being justified in making the associated perceptual claim. It is
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hard to see how any other kind of  justification could have a stronger
claim to the title “canonical”. And this justification is not defeasible.
If  someone sees that P, it cannot fail to be the case that P (2008,
pp. 383–384).
And sometimes he puts the idea in terms of  perceptual states being “guaran-
teeing” informational states; that is, attitudes to p which require the truth of p
(an idea he explicitly links to factivity in 1995, p. 402, fn. 10). However we
put it, the idea is clear. The rational support for p that we have in Good Cases
of  visual perception is, unlike whatever rational support we might have in Bad
Cases, such as to entail p. I’ll continue to put this in terms of  the idea that such
rational support is in its nature factive.
So given McDowell’s positive conception of  Good Case rational support,
and the fact that Bad Case rational support is not in its nature factive, McDowell
is obliged to view Bad Case and Good Case rational support as fundamentally
different. So McDowell is obliged to reject the common kind thesis. And this
is exactly what he does in rejecting what he calls a ‘highest common factor’
conception of  experientially grounded rational support.
So far, then, it seems fair to say that McDowell is committed to the Negative
Claim, and to that aspect of  the Core Thesis which has it that Good Case rational
support is factive. Moreover, in line with the The Specification McDowell is happy
to conceive of  the fact involving visual experiences at the heart of  his epistemo-
logical disjunctivism in terms of  states of  seeing that p. Thus in Mind and World
talk of  openness to facts, and facts being manifest in visual experience is run
together with talk of  seeing that such-and-such is the case:
in enjoying an experience one is open to manifest facts, facts that
obtain anyway and impress themselves on one’s sensibility. (At any
rate one seems to be open to facts, and when one is not misled,
one is.)… when we see that such-and-such is the case, we, and our
seeing, do not stop anywhere short of  the fact. What we see is: that
such-and-such is the case (1994, p. 29).
Finally, McDowell takes it that the factive rational support we have in Good
Cases must be reflectively accessible to one. This falls out of  perspective on
knowledge in general that McDowell has, according to which knowledge is a
standing in the space of  reasons, and the claim that ‘we lose the point of  the
space of  reasons if  we allow someone to possess a justification even if  it is out-
side his reflective reach’ (1993, p. 418, fn. 7). So the rational support for
the visual perceptual knowledge I have must be reflectively accessible to me,
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within my reflective reach, on McDowell’s view. But more specifically, Mc-
Dowell thinks that it must be reflectively available to me in such a way that I
am able to justify my knowledgeable belief  should the opportunity arise (2011,
p. 17). And I take it that being able to justify one’s belief  need not be a matter
of  being able to construct an elaborate inference, but just being able to offer
a rational explanation of  one’s perceptual belief  by citing one’s perceptual state
(e.g., by saying: I believe that there is a lemon before me because I can see that
there is a lemon before me).
I mention this internalist aspect of  McDowell’s view just to complete the
idea that McDowell can be read as an epistemological disjunctivist of  the sort
outlined in this section. There is obviously lots more to be said to get a full
understanding of  reflective accessibility, but since such details are not relevant
to my discussion below, I’ll set them aside here.
2 Plan
Here is the plan for the remainder. In the next section we’ll see that there
is a ‘basis problem’ that arises for epistemological disjunctivism. But it arises
only given that disjunctivism is formulated in terms of  seeing that p. That is, only given
a formulation that includes The Specification. The problem comes about if  we
combine The Specification with a standard view of  seeing that p. Pritchard tries
to get around the problem by rejecting the standard view. But I’ll question this
rejection. In the subsequent section I’ll suggest that this doesn’t leave episte-
mological disjunctivism with a ‘basis problem’ if  we are open to rejecting the
The Specification, and instead formulating disjunctivism in terms of  an alternative
specification: in terms not of  seeing that p but rather in terms of  seeing things.
3 The Basis Problem
First consider a standard view of  seeing that p, which Pritchard puts like this:
seeing that p just is a way of  knowing that p (i.e., it is knowing that
p via visual perception) (2012, p. 21).
This is a view we find in, for instance, Dretske (1969), Williamson (2000), and
Cassam (2009). But now Pritchard claims that this generates a problem for
epistemological disjunctivism:
if  this is indeed the right way to think about the relationship between
seeing that p and knowing that p, then it is hard to understand how
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seeing that p could constitute one’s epistemic basis for knowing that
p. After all, on this view seeing that p already presupposes knowl-
edge that p on account of  how it is just a way of  knowing that p.
But how then could seeing that p constitute one’s epistemic basis
for knowing that p? Call this the basis problem for epistemological
disjunctivism (p. 21).
At the heart of  epistemological disjunctivism as we’ve formulated it thus far
is The Specification – the idea that seeing that p is what constitutes rational support
in paradigm cases of  visual perceptual knowledge that p. If  states of  seeing that p
constitute rational support for such knowledge, it must be that such states form
the basis of  such knowledge. But how can seeing that p be the basis of  knowing
that p if  seeing that p already amounts to knowing that p? There doesn’t seem to
be sufficient distance between seeing that p and knowing that p for the former
to properly be the basis of  the latter. Thus epistemological disjunctivism seems
to be in trouble. (For helpful discussion in a different context of  some epistemic
principles we might use to motivate this sort of  problem see Cassam (2009)).
How should the epistemological disjunctivist respond to the basis problem?
I won’t survey the options here but rather launch straight into Pritchard’s own
suggested solution, which I want to query.
4 Pritchard’s Solution to the Basis Problem
Pritchard argues that the epistemological disjunctivist can avoid the basis prob-
lem by rejecting the standard view of  seeing that p, that is, by rejecting the claim
that seeing that p is just a specific way of  knowing that p (2012, p. 25). Now
the standard view of  seeing that p is to be understood in such a way that it has
as a consequence what we can call the Entailment Thesis:
Entailment Thesis
Seeing that p entails knowing that p.
Like McDowell (2002, p. 277), Pritchard thinks that S ’s seeing that p doesn’t entail
knowledge that p. Thus he rejects the Entailment Thesis, and hence rejects the
standard view of  seeing that p.
It is not as if  Pritchard is recommending rejection of  the idea that seeing
that p is an epistemically significant state. That would be to go too far, and
indeed would hardly be consistent with epistemological disjunctivism. Again,
like McDowell, Pritchard thinks that seeing that p doesn’t entail knowledge but
rather puts S in an excellent position to gain knowledge:
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a crucial distinction that we need to draw is between being in a state
that guarantees knowledge and being in a state that guarantees that
one is in a good position to gain knowledge, even if  one is unable to
properly exploit this opportunity. I want to suggest that seeing that
p is factive and robustly epistemic in the weaker latter sense rather
than in the more robust former sense. That is, seeing that p and
knowing that p come apart—such that the former can properly be
thought of  as providing an epistemic basis for the latter—and come
apart in just those cases in which an agent, on account of  seeing that
p, is thereby in a good position to gain knowledge that p and yet is
unable to properly exploit this opportunity (p. 26).
In brief: Pritchard thinks that seeing that p is ‘robustly epistemic’ in that it
guarantees that one is in a good position to gain knowledge, but not in that it
guarantees knowledge. Crucially, seeing that p is now conceived to be suffi-
ciently distinct from knowing that p for there not to be a special problem about
how it can be the basis of  such knowledge.
So Pritchard rejects the Standard View of  seeing that p by rejecting the En-
tailment Thesis. In support of  this negative contention Pritchard offers a case
which we can call BARN:
Suppose, for example, that one is in a situation in which one is gen-
uinely visually presented with a barn and circumstances are in fact
epistemically good (there’s no deception in play, one’s faculties are
functioning correctly, and so on). But now suppose further that
one has been told, by an otherwise reliable informant, that one is
presently being deceived (that one is in barn facade county, say),
even though this is in fact not the case. Clearly, in such a case
one ought not to believe the target proposition, and hence one can-
not possibly know this proposition either… Does it follow that one
does not see that the target proposition obtains?
Pritchard suggests that this does not follow, and in BARN S can see that
(B) there is a barn there.
even though she doesn’t know that B. And so the Entailment Thesis is false.
But why does Pritchard think it is plausible that S can see that B even though
she doesn’t know that B in this case? Well…
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suppose that one were to discover subsequently that the testimony
one received was false, but that everything else one knows about the
circumstances in which one was presented with this (apparent) barn
remained the same. Wouldn’t one now retrospectively treat oneself
as having earlier seen that there was a barn? Think, for example,
about how one would describe one’s situation in this regard were
one to be asked about it. Wouldn’t it be most natural to say that one
did see that there was a barn in the field, rather than to ‘hedge’ one’s
assertion by saying, for example, that one merely thought that one
saw a barn? […] But if  that’s right, then it does appear that there is
good reason for supposing that one does see that there is a barn in
this case, even though one can’t know the target proposition, and
even though one ought not to believe the proposition (and most
probably won’t believe it) (pp. 26-27).
5 Critical Discussion
Let’s grant that S doesn’t know that B in BARN. Pritchard thinks that S nonethe-
less sees that B. Call this claim Pritchard’s Verdict. Should we accept it? I will now
offer up some resistance to Pritchard’s reasons for suggesting that we accept it.
In BARN, S enjoys successful visual perceptual contact with aspects of  her
environment (e.g., the barn, and perhaps some of  its features). So in a sense,
it is clear that S sees what is before her eyes. To represent the perceptual facts
about BARN adequately we need to ensure that we capture this fact. We might
do so in a number of  ways. For instance, we might hold that she saw a barn
there, or that it looked to her as if  there was a barn there – where that is in
this case a veridical appearance grounded in the barn’s being there – etc. But
the truth and naturalness of  these descriptions is consistent with her failing to
see that B. Proponents of  the Entailment Thesis can say that she does fail to see
that B, because, given the deceptive conditions, she fails to know that B. Such
proponents can still capture the manifest perceptual facts without appeal to states
of  the sort seeing that p.
This is just to say that it is difficult to support Pritchard’s Verdict just by
reflecting upon what we need to do to adequately capture the manifest perceptual
facts about the case. But this is not yet to disagree with anything Pritchard says.
For Pritchard doesn’t argue that we need to appeal to what I’m calling Pritchard’s
Verdict to capture the manifest perceptual facts. His suggestion is rather that
support for his verdict comes from these claims:
(1) A natural description for S to give, once apprised of  the facts about
10
BARN, is: (P) “I saw that there was a barn there”.
(2) (P) is a more natural description for S to give, once apprised of  the facts
about BARN, than the hedged description: (Q) “I merely thought I saw
a barn there”.
Regarding (1) a defender of  the Entailment Thesis might offer the following
reply. They might first, in a concessive mood, agree that (P) is a natural thing
for S to say, but then resist the idea that it, and therefore, Pritchard’s Verdict,
is true. The crucial question is why is (P) a natural thing for S to say? Is the
only explanation of  the naturalness of  (P) one which requires agreement with
Pritchard’s Verdict? No. A defender of  the Entailment Thesis can suggest an
alternative explanation: (P) is a natural description of  the case, for S , because
it conveys visual perceptual success, which is a feature of  the case. Insofar as
S conveys that she was in visual perceptual contact with her environment, in
saying that she saw that B, the description is perfectly natural and conveys some
truth. But, a defender of  the Entailment Thesis can say that the description is
ultimately false because it carries the implication that S knew that B, which is
false.
What of  (2)? Pritchard draws a contrast between two descriptions:
(P) I saw that there was a barn there.
(Q) I merely thought I saw a barn.
Pritchard’s idea is that we get support for his Verdict – which is embedded in (P)
– since (P) is a more natural thing for S to say looking back on her situation, than
(Q) is. I have two things to say in response to this. The first is an application
of  the idea operative in the reply to (1). Let’s grant that (P) is a more natural
thing for S to say than (Q). Why should this support the idea that (P) is true?
This is far from clear. For we might say this: there is a naturalness difference
between (P) and (Q). But it is to be accounted for not in terms of  the idea that
(P) is straightforwardly true, whereas (Q) is false. Rather it is to be accounted
for in terms of  these differences: (a) (P) is false, but not clearly false, as it conveys
some truth (that is, to do with visual perceptual success, as mentioned above),
and (b) (Q) is false, and quite clearly so. That is, it is just obviously not so that S
merely thought she saw a barn, she did see one, this is part of  the very setup of
BARN.
The second thing to say here is that it is not as if  (P) and (Q) exhaust the
options. For, as noted above, there are different ways of  representing perceptual
success in BARN, not all of  which imply (P). For instance, it would be natural
for S to say
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(R) I saw a barn there.
This doesn’t involve or imply (P), and it is certainly more natural than (Q). (R) is
an option that needs to be on the table. The way Pritchard presents things here
obscures the fact that we can reject both (P) and (Q). Having (R) on the table
allows us to wonder whether both (P) and (Q) are both false, whereas (R) is
true. Of  course both (R) and (P) might be true, but we have to at least consider
the option that only (R) is true out of  the two. That (P) is more natural than (Q)
doesn’t undermine the idea that only (R) is true. I note this as an option for
a defender of  the Entailment Thesis, and to highlight how what Pritchard says
doesn’t appear to rule out this option. That is not to say that other considera-
tions won’t rule it out, but what are they? That is a question for one wanting to
reject the Entailment Thesis.
It seems to me then that a proponent of  the Entailment Thesis can give per-
fectly coherent and reasonable descriptions of  the naturalness facts that Pritchard
draws our attention to. Pritchard thus needs to say more if  we are to take those
facts to support the falsity of  the Entailment Thesis, and hence a rejection of
the standard view of  seeing that p.
I have merely been offering up resistance to Pritchard’s arguments on behalf  of
a defender of  the Entailment Thesis. I think that the defender of  the Entailment
Thesis is on strong ground though. I won’t argue for this here, as I have argued
for it elsewhere (see French (2012, 2013)). But let me briefly indicate why I
think the defender of  the Entailment Thesis is on strong ground. The reason is
that it is built into the semantics of  sentences of  the form ‘S sees that p’ (of  the
sort we are interested in here, e.g., (P)), that the Entailment Thesis holds. I have
argued, partly on the basis of  work in linguistics by Gisborne (2010), that part
of  what sentences of  the form ‘S sees that p’, of  the perception-ascribing sort
we are interested in, say is: there is some state of  visual perception v, of  which S
is the subject, and which is such that on the basis of v, S knows that p. So part
of  what uses of  (P) say is: there is some state of  visual perception v, of  which
I am the subject, and which is such that on the basis of v I know that there is
a barn there. Because of  the semantics of  the relevant sentence types, uses of
such sentences are ascriptions of  visual perception, but also of  knowledge based
on that visual perception. Thus the Entailment Thesis holds.
There is clearly much more to be said here about the Standard View and
the Entailment Thesis (see e.g., the arguments against the Entailment Thesis in
Turri (2010), and my reply in French (2012)), but absent further reasons to reject
the standard view of  seeing that p, we seem to be back with the basis problem
for epistemological disjunctivism.
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6 Summary
Epistemological disjunctivism as we’ve encountered it so far is formulated in
terms of  seeing that p. That’s what we get from:
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The Specification
The particular kind of  rational support that the epistemological dis-
junctivist claims that our beliefs enjoy in paradigm cases of  percep-
tual knowledge is that provided by seeing that the target proposition
obtains. So when one has paradigmatic perceptual knowledge of
a proposition, p, one’s reflectively accessible rational support for
believing that p is that one sees that p.
We can now note that there are two versions of  this:
The Specification + The Standard View
The Specification + the standard view of  states of  seeing that p
where that includes the Entailment Thesis.
The Specification + The McDowell-Pritchard View
The Specification + McDowell and Pritchard’s understanding of
states of  seeing that p where the Entailment Thesis doesn’t hold.
Now the problem with epistemological disjunctivism formulated the first
way is the basis problem. And the problem with epistemological disjunctivism
formulated the second way is that we have as yet no evidence to suppose that
there are states of  seeing that p which don’t conform to the standard view of
seeing that p.
In response to these issues we might think that epistemological disjunctivism
is in trouble. But I don’t think that. I think the issues should lead us to ask
these crucial questions: why should we accept the McDowellian inheritance
and formulate epistemological disjunctivism in terms of  seeing that p in the
first place? Can we formulate epistemological disjunctivism without appealing
to states of  seeing that p (on either of  the understandings of  such states we have
encountered)? I’ll argue that we can.
7 The Thing Seeing Specification
If  an alternative formulation of  epistemological disjunctivism is still to count as
a version of  epistemological disjunctivism, it will need to be a specification of
the Core Thesis, which, it will be remembered, is the following:
The Core Thesis
In paradigmatic cases of  perceptual knowledge an agent, S , has per-
ceptual knowledge that  in virtue of  being in possession of  rational
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support, R, for her belief  that  which is both factive (i.e. R’s obtain-
ing entails ), and reflectively accessible to S .
So what can we offer?
There is a lemon before me. It seems to be part of  common sense to suppose
that rational support for beliefs about the lemon before me can come from my
plainly seeing it. Suppose I know, by vision, that the lemon before me is yellow.
We can think of  the visual basis of  this knowledge in terms of  my seeing the
yellow lemon. How do I know that the lemon is yellow? Because I see it. So
one option to explore here is whether Good Case rational support can come
from states of  the form seeing x (or seeing an F thing).
I want to explore this idea now. To be clear, what we are focusing on is what
we might put in terms of  a specification of  the Core Thesis, something like this
(again with the restriction to vision):
The Thing Seeing Specification
The particular kind of  rational support that the epistemological dis-
junctivist claims that our beliefs enjoy in paradigm cases of  percep-
tual knowledge is that provided by visual perceptual states of  the
form seeing x (or seeing an F thing).
I’ll make two general remarks about this specification and then consider a chal-
lenge concerning whether it can really be a specification of  the Core Thesis.
The first thing to note here is that ‘thing’ is a dummy term, which is, as
Dretske (1979) puts it, ‘intended to cover such disparate items as tables, houses,
cats, people, games, sunsets, signals, tracks, shadows, movements, flashes, and
specks’ (p. 98). The values that x can take in states of  the form S sees x (and
S sees an F x) are rich and varied: think of  all of  the different sorts of  things or
entities (particulars) that you can clap your eyes upon.
Second, in this specification we are not appealing to states of  seeing that p
as such states are conceived on the standard view of  seeing that p. And the
states we are appealing to don’t entail such states. Thus, this specification does
differ from the Specification + The Standard View. One way to illustrate this is
as follows. I see a yellow lemon, but I just don’t form beliefs about the lemon’s
colour. Perhaps my attention is completely elsewhere (e.g., on the object to the
side of  the lemon, or some mathematical matter, or whatever). Thus, I don’t
see that the lemon is yellow. Or perhaps I am just not capable of  making colour
judgements concerning objects like lemons – so I certainly can’t see that the
lemon is yellow. But for all that, I can see the yellow lemon.
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And for similar reasons the perceptual states we are appealing to here don’t
entail states of  knowledge. I can see a yellow lemon, and yet not know that the
lemon is yellow. To know that the lemon is yellow I must believe that the lemon
is yellow, and, as noted, the mere fact that I perceive the yellow lemon doesn’t
guarantee that I judge or believe that the lemon is yellow – I might not make
anything, cognitively, of  my perception. (For a richer defence of  similar claims,
see Dretske (1969)).
I’ve noted how states of  seeing an F thing don’t amount to states of  see-
ing that p (as standardly conceived). Nor do they amount to or entail states of
knowing that p. Thus a version of  epistemological disjunctivism formulated in
terms of  the Thing Seeing Specification won’t face the basis problem that the
version of  epistemological disjunctivism formulated in terms of  the Specifica-
tion + The Standard View faces.
7.1 A Challenge Concerning Factivity
But we need more by way of  an assurance that the Thing Seeing Specification
can genuinely be a specification of  the Core Thesis. What more can we say
about states of  seeing an F thing so as to appreciate how the Thing Seeing
Specification can serve as a specification of  the Core Thesis? As noted, I am
bracketing issues to do with reflective accessibility here, so I will address only
the factivity aspect of  the Core Thesis. Accordingly, one thing we need to make
sure of  is that states of  seeing an F thing can constitute factive rational support
for beliefs.
We can animate this question in the form of  a challenge. On the face of
it the states we are appealing to in the Thing Seeing Specification don’t have a
propositional structure. That is to say, they are not, on the face of  it, propo-
sitional attitudes. (We are, after all, concerned with seeing in the sense of  ‘see’
which doesn’t take a propositional complement). We might then wonder how
such states can constitute or provide rational support which is factive. For on
one understanding of  a factive mental state, it is a propositional attitude that one
can have only to truths. Seeing that p is such a mental state. It is a propositional
attitude one can have only to a true content. But if  seeing a yellow lemon, for
instance, is not a propositional attitude, then it can’t be a factive mental state in
the technical sense just mentioned. How then can states of  that sort constitute
or provide factive rational support for beliefs? This a question we must answer
if  we want the Thing Seeing Specification to be a genuine specification of  the
Core Thesis.
One way to try to meet this challenge is by taking on substantive commit-
ments regarding the nature of  states in which one sees an F thing, so that after
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all such states are able to constitute factive states in the technical sense. I con-
sider a development of  this line of  thought in the next section, and a different
line of  thought in the section after.
8 The Propositional Thing Seeing Approach
One option here is to suggest that although on the face of  it states of  seeing a
yellow lemon and the like are not propositional, they in fact really are proposi-
tional, in some sense. For once we start to do theoretical work in the philosophy
of  perception, we will see that states of  seeing an F thing have to be proposi-
tional in some sense. Even if  not straightforwardly propositional, it might be
argued that they have to at least constitutively involve propositional attitudes. One
might think this, for instance, if  one holds to (A) the natural idea that states
of  seeing either are perceptual experiences (of  some sort), or at least are hy-
brid states which involve experiences (an experiential component), and (B) a
propositional theory of  perceptual experiences.
Take (A). When I see a yellow lemon, I have a visual experience. And this
is part of  what it is to see a thing. I’ll understand this in terms of  perceptual
appearances: in seeing a thing, the thing I see must look some way or other to
me. The specific experience I have – the specific perceptual appearance – is not
determined merely by what I see and how it is. Just because I see a yellow lemon
doesn’t mean that my experience will be one in which it looks yellow to me (as
opposed to, say, green). The point of  (A) is just that if  I see an F x I must have
some visual experience or other of x; it must look some way or other to me.
We might then ask how we are to understand such perceptual appearances,
and here is where (B) comes in. A simple propositional theory of  experience
states that experiences are mental states which involve propositional contents
and relations to those contents (see, e.g., Searle (1983)). An entity’s appearing F
to one in perceptual experience is understood as a propositional attitude with the
content, say, that is F. And further, it is understood as a propositional attitude in
which that content is presented to one as true. Thus experiencing is a perceptual
propositional attitude more like believing than, say, hoping, or desiring. (For a
more detailed discussion of  propositional views of  perceptual experience see
Martin (2002), Crane (2011), and Siegel (2011)).
With this background, a proponent of  the Thing Seeing Specification can
elaborate on the Thing Seeing Specification in the following way. They can say
that when I know that the lemon before me is yellow on the basis of  vision,
the visual basis of  this is a state of  thing seeing, seeing a lemon. But it is to be
understood richly as (or as involving) a sort of  experience in which the thing I
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see looks yellow to me. This – the experience, or experiential component – is
in fact a perceptual propositional attitude. The experience is a state in which I
visually experience that that [the lemon before me] is yellow. So the states of  thing
seeing involved in paradigm cases of  perceptual knowledge are well suited to
qualify as a factive mental states in the technical sense, for they are (or involve)
propositional attitudes.
But something more needs to be added here, namely, that the propositional
attitudes which constitute such states of  thing seeing are factive – essentially re-
lations to true propositions. So, in a case where I see a yellow lemon and this
grounds my knowledge that the lemon before is yellow, and where we think of
this in terms of  visually experiencing that it is yellow, me must understand this
visual experience as one I can have only to a true content. It is a factive kind
of  visual experience, and thus not like the visual experiences we have in hal-
lucinations. We can, if  we chose, put this in McDowell’s way. The perceptual
appearances involved in such experiences are cases of  facts making themselves
manifest (McDowell (1982)). Some experiences which strike us as exactly the
same, from the inside (e.g., hallucinations), are mere appearances.
So, on this propositional way of  developing the Thing Seeing Specification
– call it the Propositional Thing Seeing Approach – the perceptual states of  the sort
mentioned in the Thing Seeing Specification do involve or are propositional atti-
tudes. And, moreover, they involve or are factive propositional attitudes. Experi-
ences understood as such are obviously well suited to constitute factive rational
support, for they are factive mental states in the technical sense. Thus if  we
work out the Thing Seeing Specification in these terms, we can meet the fac-
tivity challenge, and we can see how the Thing Seeing Specification can be a
genuine specification of  the Core Thesis (so long as we get matters of  reflective
accessibility straight).
Does the Thing Seeing Specification developed along these lines collapse
into either the Specification + The Standard View, or the Specification + the
McDowell-Pritchard View? Here, as a reminder, are the different specifications
we have distinguished
The Specification
The particular kind of  rational support that the epistemological dis-
junctivist claims that our beliefs enjoy in paradigm cases of  percep-
tual knowledge is that provided by seeing that the target proposition
obtains. So when one has paradigmatic perceptual knowledge of
a proposition, p, one’s reflectively accessible rational support for
believing that p is that one sees that p.
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The Specification + The Standard View
The Specification + the Standard view of  states of  seeing that p
where that includes the Entailment Thesis.
The Specification + The McDowell-Pritchard View
The Specification + McDowell and Pritchard’s understanding of
states of  seeing that p where the Entailment Thesis doesn’t hold.
Even if  we insist that states of  seeing an F thing are to be understood in the rich,
and propositional way discussed above, it is still not at all obvious why we should
suppose that they are knowledge entailing. I can see a yellow lemon and my
experience can be a factive propositional attitude in which I visually represent
that that [lemon] is yellow, even if  I don’t know that it is yellow. Again, perhaps
I am just not paying attention to relevant features of  the scene, or perhaps I
am not capable of  making the relevant judgements, even though the fact that
the lemon is yellow is shaping my visual consciousness. So the Thing Seeing
Specification doesn’t collapse into the Specification + The Standard View.
It is much less clear, however, why the Thing Seeing Specification, devel-
oped along these lines, doesn’t collapse into the Specification+ The McDowell-
Pritchard View (for short, the McDowell-Pritchard Approach). For what more is
there to S ’s being in a state of  seeing that p, in the sense in which McDowell and
Pritchard want to use the expression ‘S sees that p’, than S being in a state of  thing
seeing as that is cashed out on the above propositional theory? For McDowell,
as we noted above, the idea of  seeing that p is run together with facts being
made manifest to one in visual experience.
Let’s grant that the visual perceptual states themselves – that is, those factive
states which are the grounds of  perceptual knowledge in paradigm cases of  such
knowledge – are conceived of  in the same way, at the level of  the nature of  the
states, by the proponent of  the Propositional Thing Seeing Approach, and the
proponent of  the McDowell-Pritchard Approach. Accordingly, the approaches
are, on that point, substantially the same.
But the positions are not exactly the same overall. For it makes a difference
whether the visual perceptual states are thought of  as states of  thing seeing, or
states of  seeing that p. If  we insist that they are states of  seeing that p – in the
ordinary sense of  ‘sees that p’ – as McDowell and Pritchard do, then we take
on an extra commitment. As we’ve seen, this is the denial of  the Entailment
Thesis. And this is just what I questioned above. If, however, we stick with the
formulation in terms just of  thing seeing, with the details of  the propositional
theory, we don’t take on this dubious commitment. On these grounds, then,
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the Propositional Thing Seeing Approach is to be preferred, it is less committed
than the McDowell-Pritchard Approach.
Here, then, are the lessons of  the discussion so far. When it comes to formu-
lating epistemological disjunctivism it looks lie the Specification+The Standard
View won’t work – because of  the basis problem. But then the Specification +
The McDowell-Pritchard View is problematic too – because it involves the de-
nial of  the Entailment Thesis. Comparatively, and more constructively, it looks
like the Propositional Thing Seeing Approach is to be preferred. And that is what
I’ve argued so far.
But that is not the point on which I want to end. For I now want to suggest
that there is an alternative way to develop the Thing Seeing Specification – that
is, an alternative way for it to meet the factivity challenge – which is even better
than the McDowell-Pritchard Approach, and the Propositional Thing Seeing
Approach, in an important way: it simply doesn’t involve a commitment to the
metaphysics of  experience involved in those two other approaches. I call this
the ‘Minimal Thing Seeing Approach’. I turn to this now.
9 The Minimal Thing Seeing Approach
A version of  epistemological disjunctivism has to work out a way for the per-
ceptual states which form the basis of  paradigmatic perceptual knowledge to
provide factive rational support. It makes sense, then, to get involved in think-
ing about the nature of  the perceptual states in question. The views we’ve con-
sidered so far all try to work out how the perceptual states in question can
themselves be (or involve) factive states in the technical sense of  being fac-
tive propositional attitudes. The Propositional Thing Seeing Approach, and the
McDowell-Pritchard Approach, thus take on substantive commitments in the
metaphysics of  perception. That is, they are committed to the view that there are
some states of  perception – that is, those involved in paradigmatic perceptual
knowledge – which constitutively involve propositional representational con-
tent. The perceptual states in question are a species of  representational state.
Taking on such metaphysical commitments in formulating one’s epistemol-
ogy of  perception is perfectly acceptable if  the commitments are obvious, or un-
contentious, or unavoidable. But the particular commitment we’ve encountered
here is none of  the above. It is not obvious or uncontentious, it is a theoretical
commitment which is denied by many. For instance, some want to resist repre-
sentational theories of  experience (see, e.g., Travis (2004), Kalderon (2011a,b),
and Brewer (2011)). And others, though they endorse the idea that perceptual
states are representational, want to resist the idea that they involve propositional
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or propositionally structured representation (see e.g., Burge (2010) and Crane
(2011)).
Still, one might suggest that the commitment in question is just what one
has to take on if  one wants to be an epistemological disjunctivist. And this is exactly
what I now want to question. I think it is plausible to suppose that we have
to think about the nature of  the relevant perceptual states if  we are to develop
the epistemological disjunctivist programme. But it is wrong to suppose that
we must therefore take on the metaphysical commitment identified above. This
is what the Minimal Thing Seeing Approach will allow us to appreciate. The
idea is that there are facts about the nature of  thing seeing, which are relatively
theory neutral, but which mean that states of  thing seeing can constitute factive
states. How can we spell this out?
The key is to see how a state of  thing seeing can constitute factive rational
support for p without being a factive mental state in the technical sense – where
that would require it to be a propositional state. The way to see how this is
possible is to note that seeing an F thing is similar to seeing that a (the, that)
thing is F, in this sense: S cannot see an an F thing if  there isn’t an F thing
there to be seen. Seeing a yellow lemon requires that there is a yellow lemon
there to see. Seeing a yellow lemon may not be a factive mental state in the
technical – propositional – sense, but even so, if S sees a yellow lemon, then
there must be a lemon which S sees and it must be yellow. Thus, a formulation
of  epistemological disjunctivism in terms not of  seeing that p but in terms of
seeing an F thing can capture what is essential to the idea that Good Cases
involve factive – truth-guaranteeing – rational support. A disjunctivist can say
that a subject who sees the yellow lemon is, just like the subject who sees that
the lemon is yellow, in a mental state (a seeing) the presence of  which guarantees
the truth of  the belief  (or beliefs) it rationally supports (that the lemon is yellow).
Understood in this way the Thing Seeing Specification is a genuine speci-
fication of  the Core Thesis (again, assuming that we have matters of  reflective
accessibility straight). Suppose that S has an item of  paradigmatic perceptual
knowledge. They know that that [lemon] is yellow. An epistemological disjunc-
tivist can say that the rational support R for this belief  is constituted by their
seeing a yellow lemon. R, the fact that S sees a yellow lemon, entails that the
lemon is yellow. Thus R is rational support which is in its nature factive: R could
not obtain in a situation in which the relevant content is false.
What I have just said draws on the following idea we find in McDowell
if  a perceptual state can consist in a subject’s having a feature of
her environment perceptually present to her, that gives lie to the
assumption that a perceptual state cannot warrant a belief  in a way
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that guarantees its truth. If  a perceptual state makes a feature of
the environment present to a perceiver’s rationally self-conscious
awareness, there is no possibility, compatibly with someone’s being
in that state, that things are not as the state would warrant her in
believing that they are, in a belief  that would simply register the
presence of  that feature of  the environment (McDowell (2011, p.
31)).
Seeing a lemon there is a way for a lemon to be perceptually present to one. If  it
merely looks to one as if  there is a lemon there, then a lemon is not perceptually
present to one, but if  one genuinely sees a lemon there, then a lemon is present
to one. Thus that perceptual state can serve as a truth-guaranteeing warrant for
a belief  with the content: there is a lemon there. What I said above is an expansion
of  McDowell’s idea, and we can put it alternatively like this: If  one sees a yellow
lemon, then, in the McDowellian idiom, there is no possibility, compatibly with
someone’s being in that perceptual state, that things are not as the state would
warrant her in believing that they are in a belief  that would involve the attribution
of  the feature in question to the object in question. Thus such perceptual states
can serve to constitute factive rational support, even if  they are not themselves
factive mental states in the technical sense.
What is doing the work here is that seeing an F x requires the existence of
an F x. (It is in this respect that seeing is just like standing next to a thing. If
I stand next to a red postbox, then there must be a red postbox there which I
stand next to). This – the idea that seeing is subject to an existence condition
– is not a special theoretical point about seeing, it is just a basic point about the
logic or structure of  states seeing, which all sides can agree on. And it is this
which enables us to assuage the challenge regarding factivity, and see how the
Thing Seeing Specification can be a genuine specification of  the Core Thesis,
without taking on a metaphysics of  thing seeing on which it is a propositional
representational state. That may be true, I am not suggesting that a proponent
of  the Thing Seeing Specification commits to a denial of  that. The point is that
it is not required to cash out how a formulation of  epistemological disjunctivism
in terms of  thing seeing can meet the factivity challenge.
Now one might grant that an epistemological disjunctivist can answer the
challenge concerning factivity in this more neutral way, yet claim that still some
appeal to states of  seeing having propositional content will need to be made in
order to get other aspects of  the epistemology of  perception straight. I’ll now
describe one way of  pressing this allegation.
Suppose that S sees a yellow lemon, and on that basis comes to judge (and
know) that it is yellow. In seeing the yellow lemon S has factive rational support
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to believe that that is yellow (among other contents). But how does the specific
content: that is yellow get singled out in S ’s cognitive space, so to speak, as a
content to judge, as a content about which S becomes knowledgable? If  we
take it that seeing the yellow lemon is a state with propositional content, and on
an occasion the specific content that is yellow, we can explain this: the content is
already present in perception. It is then taken up in cognition as a content of
knowledge. But if  all we have in the picture is merely that S sees a yellow lemon,
we lack a story about how S comes to entertain the content: that is yellow. There
doesn’t seem to be anything about the structure of  experience which enables us
to see how S comes to entertain the specific content in question.
One thing to say here is that it is not obvious that a defender of  a proposi-
tional approach is really in any better position. For if  we are considering seeing a
thing, a yellow lemon, we need some explanation of  how one’s perceptual experience
of  the lemon comes to have a specific content (e.g., that is yellow). What is it about
S , her situation, the conditions, the scene before her, etc which means that in
seeing a yellow lemon she comes to propositionally represent it in a certain way
(as, say, yellow)? It is not obvious how to answer this question. And it is also not
obvious that whatever a defender of  a propositional approach says here won’t
be able to be taken up in a more neutral framework, by way of  explaining how
perceptually based cognition gets to involve specific contents.
But a more direct way that a defender of  the Minimal Thing Seeing Approach
can deal with the challenge is to point out that it is misleading to claim that all
we have in the picture is merely that S sees a yellow lemon. For in seeing a yellow
lemon S has a visual experience, in which the lemon appears some way to her.
That is part of  what is involved in seeing a yellow lemon. What grounds which
contents S comes to entertain in seeing the yellow lemon is in part a function of
how things appear to her in seeing the yellow lemon. A defender of  the Minimal
Thing Seeing Approach can suggest that S comes to entertain the content that
is yellow partly because of  the way the lemon appears to her in her experience
of  it: namely, as yellow. So the minimal thing seeing theorist doesn’t deny that
there is an element to the structure of  experience, a presentation or appearance
of  an object as being a certain way, which facilitates the singling out of  a specific
content in cognition.
A proponent of  such an approach can flesh out the thing seeing specifi-
cation in this manner. They can say that the states of  perception which are
involved in paradigmatic cases of  perceptual knowledge are states of  thing see-
ing, understood in this way: in a paradigmatic case of  perceptual knowledge
where S knows that that is F on the basis of  vision, this is because S sees an F
thing for what it is; where, that is, the F thing appears F to S . This is a minimal
thing seeing approach because (a) the way in which the states of  thing seeing
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are held to constitute factive rational support draws not on some commitment
to a propositional theory of  experience, but rather just to features of  the logic
of  seeing which all sides can agree on, and (b) there is an appeal to perceptual
appearances – which is again a non-theoretical aspect of  the nature of  seeing –
though no appeal to a propositional theory of  the nature of  such appearances.
The very idea of  an experience in which a thing appears to a subject in a certain
way may be accounted for in terms of  a propositional view of  experience. But
such an account doesn’t flow from the very idea of  perceptual appearances.
10 Conclusion
How are we to formulate epistemological disjunctivism? If  we understand epis-
temological disjunctivism in terms of  the Core Thesis (see section (1)), then we
have a number of  alternatives (not all of  which have been properly appreciated
in the literature on epistemological disjunctivism up to this point):
1. The Specification + Standard View
2. The McDowell-Pritchard Specification
3. The Thing Seeing Specification
(a) The Propositional Thing Seeing Approach
(b) The Minimal Thing Seeing Approach
On the one hand we can go with the Specification + Standard View. But
then, as Pritchard has argued, we run into the basis problem (see section (3)). We
might then go with the McDowell-Pritchard Specification, but this involves the
dubious, or at the least unsupported denial of  the Entailment Thesis (see sec-
tions (4) and (5)), and substantive commitments in the metaphysics of  percep-
tion. We make progress by introducing a Thing Seeing Specification (see section
(7)). But this can be understood in different ways too. The Propositional Thing
Seeing Approach (section (8)) is an improvement on the McDowell-Pritchard
Specification, for it is consistent with the Entailment Thesis. But it still involves
the substantive commitments in the metaphysics of  perception. In contrast,
there is a Minimal Thing Seeing Approach (section (9)). This is preferable to all
of  the other approaches. For it doesn’t run into a basis problem. It is consis-
tent with the Entailment Thesis. And as I argued in the previous section it is a
genuine specification of  the Core Thesis which doesn’t involve the substantive
commitments in the metaphysics of  perception we find in other approaches.
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Whether epistemological disjunctivism is true or not is a further question.
But when trying to assess a philosophical position, we are much better off  if
we have a clearer idea of  the different forms it can take – especially the more
minimal forms. So I hope what I have done here can contribute significantly
to future assessment of  whether epistemological disjunctivism is true. In par-
ticular, I hope we can now see more clearly that the truth of  epistemological
disjunctivism doesn’t hang on the full McDowellian inheritance. A version of
it is still available even if  we reject McDowell’s metaphysics of  perception, and
even if  we hold on to the standard view of  seeing that p.
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